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From experience, a significant number of recent computer breakins - perhaps the majority - can
be traced back to an instance of a poorly-chosen reusable password. Once a system intruder has gained
access to one account by breaking a password, it is often a simple matter to find system flaws and
weaknesses that thereafter allow entry to other accounts and increasing amounts of privilege.
The OPUS project being conducted at Purdue is an attempt to screen users' selection of passwords
to prevent poor choices. The focus of the project is on using screening methods that are both time and
space-efficient and to provide a mechanism that is effective for workstations with little or no disk as well
as mainframes.
To test this mechanism, we require a representative sample of real passwords. Thus, we constructed
a method of sampling real passwords choices as they were made by users. The challenge of such a
sampling mechanism is how to protect it from attack, and how to protect the results from being used
against the system. This paper discusses our approach, and some of our initial observations on the words
collected.
1 Introduction
From experience, a significant number of recent computer breakins - perhaps the majority - can be traced
back to an instance of a poorly-chosen reusable password. l Once a system intruder has gained access to
one account by breaking a password, it is often a simple matter to find system flaws and weaknesses that
thereafter allow entry to other accounts and increasing amounts of privilege.
Reusable passwords provide a cost-effective method of authentication. They do not require special
hardware, they may be used from any fOlTIl of dial-in port or telTIlinal connected to the target system, the
•This paper also appeared as [11].
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Communications from members of the CERT/CC and from local system administrators support this observation.
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mechanism can easily be understood by most users, and they allow users to manage some of their own
account security. Reusable passwords have been widely studied[13] and they seem to be well-understood..
For these reasons, they are often used as the primary form of authentication in multi-user systems, and in
many single-user products.
Reusable passwords also present problems. Although they are easy to use and low in cost, they rely
on the strength of the passwords chosen and their resistance to concerted attacks. When users choose their
own passwords, the security is tied to the level of sophistication of each user to make appropriate choices.
Uncaring, sloppy, or uneducated users may make password choices that are easily guessed orbroken, leading
to a system penetration. If the choice of possible characters to use in the password is too small, or if the
overall length of the password is too short, the password may be compromisable. Even a rich character set
may not be sufficient to create secure passwords if the combination of characters is restricted to an arbitrary
set ofpossibilities. Thus, good password choice should avoid common words and names (cf. [1,5,7,8,9]).
One weakness with reusable password systems is the choice of the password. As a commonly-used ex-
ample, considerthe UNIX2 password system.[8] The currentpassword mechanism is based on a cryptographic
transformation of a fixed string of zero bits, using the user-supplied password as a key. The transformation
is normally an altered version of DES encryption, performed 25 times. The transformation is sufficiently
slow so that exhaustive keyspace attacks are currently not practical, although fast implementations exist that
can perform many tens of thousands of comparisons per second.
In UNIX, the encrypted version of the password has traditionally been kept in a world-readable file; the
safety of the passwords has been protected by the time-complexity of an exhaustive attack. Thus, one of the
factors in the safety of UNIX passwords is a large potential keyspace for passwords. If the full character set
is used, and six-to-eight-character passwords are chosen, the number of potential passwords to be searched
is far too large to be successfully searched, even at high speed. Assuming a usable character set of 120
characters, there are 43,359,498,756,302,520 (4.34 *1016) possible passwords oflength one through eight.
At 50,000 attempts per second, an exhaustive search of this keyspace would require over 27,480 years to
complete.
Unfortunately, in UNIX and other systems, users often select passwords that do not exploit the large
keyspace available. Instead, they choose common words and names, or simple transformations of those
names. This greatly simplifies an attacker's task if these common words are searched first.
There are four basic methods for a system administrator to enforce better reusable password security on
a computer system:
1. Educate and encourage users to make better choices of passwords.
2. Generate strong passwords for users and do not allow them to choose passwords of their own creation.
This is often done using some random password generator.
3. Check passwords after-the-fact and force users to change those that can be easily broken with a
dictionary attack.
4. Screen users' password choices and prevent weak ones from being installed.
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This first method, that of educating users to choose strong passwords, is not likely to be of use in
environments where there is a significant number of novices, or where turnover is high. Users might not
understand the importance of choosing strong passwords, and novice users are not the best judges of what
is "obvious." For instance, novice users (mistakenly) may believe that reversing a word, or capitalizing the
last letter makes a password "strong." Also, no matter how good the education may be, some users may
forget, or may believe that it is not significant to follow the guidelines, leading to a transient (or long-term)
endangerment.
A further problem is if the education provided to users on how to select a password is itself dangerous.
For instance, if the education provided gives users a specific way to create passwords - such as using the
first letters of a favorite phrase - then many of the users may use that exact algorithm, thus making an
attack easier.
The second method of strengthening passwords is to generate the passwords for the users and not allow
them the opportunity to select a weak password. For this mechanism to work well the passwords need to
be randomly drawn from the whole keyspace. Unfortunately, this method also has flaws. In particular, the
"random" mechanism chosenmightnot be truly random, and could be analyzed by an attacker. Furthermore,
random passwords are often difficult to memorize (especially if they are changed (aged) regularly). As a
result, users may write the passwords down, thus providing an opportunity to intercept them without the
effort of a dictionary search.
The third method of preventing poor password choice is to scan the passwords selected, after they are
chosen, to see if any are weak. This is supported by many systems, including deszip, Crack, and COPS.[4]
There are significant problems with this approach:
• The dictionary used in the search may not be comprehensive enough to catch some weak passwords.
Outside attackers might scan for these choices, but the system password scanner would not include
them in the search.
• The scanning approach takes time, even for a fast implementation. A lucky (or determined) attacker
may be able penetrate a system through a weak password before it is discovered by the scanner. This
is especially a problem in an environment with a very large number of users and systems.
• The output of a scanner may be intercepted and used against the system.
Additionally, there is not always a correlation between finding a weak password and getting it replaced with
a stronger one. In many academic, business and government settings, it is difficult or impossible to force
higher-level managers to change their passwords.
The fourth method, that of disallowing the choice of poor passwords in the first place, appears to have
none ofthe drawbacks mentioned above. However, it too has difficulties associated with it. In particular, the
storage required to keep a sufficiently large dictionary may prevent this method from being used on work-
stations and small computer systems. For instance, the standard UNIX dictionary, /usr / diet /words, is
about 25,000 words and 200,000 bytes of space. A dictionary of 10 to 20 times that size would be necessary
for reasonable protection; there are over 170,000 words in Webster's New World Dictionary, and that would
occupy well over a million bytes of disk storage. That figure does not include many slang and colloquial
words and phrases, nor does it include any user names, local names and phrases, likely words in foreign
languages, or other strings shown to be poor password choices. A moderately comprehensive dictionary I
have used in password research has over 500,000 entries, and requires over five million bytes of storage.
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My full-fledged collection of dictionaries, including words in 11 foreign languages, proper names, an atlas,
and a collection of slang tenns, occupies over 30 megabytes of storage.
Maintaining a large dictionary is also difficult. To add new words or phrases means that the dictionary
must have additional space overhead for indexing or it must be sorted after each addition - otherwise,
lookups take time proportional to the length of the dictionary. In small computer environments, neither of
these alternatives may be appropriate.
The OPUS project at Purdue is directed towards remedying some of the weaknesses of reusable pass-
words by screening user choices. OPUS is innovative because it solves the problem of using a huge
screening dictionary while occupying a modest amount of disk space and computation. OPUS is designed
around a compact representation of a dictionary in the form of a Bloom filter[2]. A Bloom filter is a large
hashed structure with boolean values to represent its contents. Each probe value is hashed multiple times,
using multiple hashing algorithms. Ifall corresponding bits are set, the probe represents a value in the table;
any misses are definitely not known values. The filter may be tuned for accuracy or size.
In OPUS, when a user attempts to set a new password, it (and simple permutations of it) are hashed into
the Bloom filter. Ifa match is found, the choice is rejected. OPUS can be integrated with other mechanisms,
like Kerberos, and may be configured to supportpassword aging as part of its design. Details ofthe structure
of OPUS are not the main focus of this paper; the interested reader may refer to [12] for further design
details.
To properly evaluate an implementation of OPUS, it will be necessary to check its behavior against a
large body of actual user passwords. These passwords must be typical of those of a real user population
that OPUS is intended to support, and they must furthermore not be unduly skewed by the manner of their
selection. In particular, attempting to break actual passwords and using only those that are "breakable" does
not give an accurate dataset for analysis. Thus, using a set of words produced from a study like that in [6]
would be interesting, but not realistic enough for true calibration.
This requirement for real passwords means that we need a collection of password choices by actual
users. However, to get these passwords means we must somehow capture "live" passwords from users as
they are chosen. This fonn of sampling may result in a compromise of the security of the system where the
passwords are collected. How is it possible to store the passwords begin collected in such a way that they
cannot be sampled or broken and used to penetrate the system?
Section 2 describes the design of the password collector that was designed for this task, and some of
the considerations involved in designing it. Section 3 describes some preliminary analysis of the password
choices collected. Section 4 describes future work.
2 Design Considerations
The design of the password collection method was influenced by five significant concerns, of roughly equal
importance:
• The data should be safeguarded during collection so that the collected passwords are undecipherable
by anyone on the collecting system, authorized or not. That is, the passwords should be protected at
least as well as by the existing password mechanism.
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• The subsequent analysis ofthe collected passwords should pose no threat to the security ofthe systems
involved.
• Users whosepasswords werebeing collected should bepresented with information about the collection
effort and given the opportunity to opt out of the collection effort, if they so desired.
• The collection should be as complete as possible, and not skewed by selection of a particular class of
user, nor influenced by existing password screening methods.
• The administrators of the systems involved should feel completely comfortable with the installation
of the software and collection of user passwords.
Each of these will be further discussed in the following sections.
2.1 Safeguards
Answering the first concern, that of safeguarding the passwords, was perhaps the most crucial aspect of the
whole process. If the collected passwords were not safe from a system cracker or accidental disclosure, the
system administrators would never wish to install the collection software. If the passwords could be read
by inappropriate personnel, users (especially more sophisticated users) would not want to participate in the
collection effort.
At first examination, this would seem to be a simple task. The password setting programs (usually,
passwd and yppasswd) run setuid to the super-user. Thus, the collection mechanism could log its output
to aprotected file, unreadable to any by the super-user. However, furtherreflection on this approach revealed
several flaws:
• UNIX has been shown, time and again, to be susceptible to unanticipated break-ins. Having the
passwords in a protected file might still allow them to be read by unauthorized users.
• An accident of protection might render the file readable, thus compromising all of the accounts.
• Some ofthe users have accounts on othermachines in otherprotection domains. Thus, ifthe passwords
could be read by anyone on one machine, it might compromise a machine in another location.
• The file would be saved to tape by the regular backup procedures, and the tape might be read or
compromised by someone other than the authorized system administrators.
When all of these points were taken into account, it became clear that the only possible way of
safeguarding the collected words was to encrypt them in some strong manner, with a key unknown even to
the system administrator. ill this manner, the words could be saved to a file and there would be no concern
if that file was disclosed or read.
However, no standard private-key encryption mechanism could possibly be used. The reason for this is
that the key would have to be present in the collector itself, and this could be reverse-engineered to discover
it. The existing UNIX password mechanism, which uses the password itself as the key, could not be used
because the results would not be decodable for study after collection.
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A public key mechanism does not suffer from these problems if the private key is kept secret. For
this reason, the collector was constructed to use the RSA public-key encryption mechanism.[1O] Using
this method allows a key (the public key) can be be disclosed without compromising the encrypted data
(assuming that appropriate keys are chosen).3 Furthermore, the strength ofRSA is known (cf. [3]), and this
would help assure everyone involved in the study of the safety of the collected passwords.
Using the method described in [3], two 1000+ binary bit prime numbers were generated, resulting in a
modulus of 2015 binary bits. The public key was then generated, being 994 binary bits. These keys are long
enough that a brute-force attack with current technology would likely exceed the lifetime of the universe
(ct. the discussion in chapter 15 of [5]).
The private key was also calculated but it has not been disclosed to anyone. To prevent the keys or
generation algorithms from being discovered, all calculations and storage of values was done in an off-
campus location, on removable media, on a machine that had no connections to any other machine during
the calculation process. The key is currently stored, in encrypted form, on removable media that will not be
mounted on a machine with external connections.
Other, small safeguards were taken in the coding of the collection software to prevent disclosure or
subversion of the mechanism. For instance, the code was designed to fork a child process to do the
encryption and storage to the database. If a reasonable cpu time limit was exceeded, the child process would
terminate. The child process would also ignore signals, and would not leave a core file if it should terminate
abnormally.
2.2 Analysis
Obviously, protecting the passwords during collection would be an exercise in futility if they were then
decrypted and used in a marmer that would make them available to others. The purpose of the experiment
was to collect passwords for analysis, and to eventually publish that analysis. Thus, it was important to
designate the conditions under which the passwords would be decrypted, analyzed, and discussed.
After considerable discussion with the system administrators involved, the following were developed
as the ground rules for any use of the data collected. A one year (12 month) limit was placed on all these
restrictions following the collection of the last password (1 May 1992). This is based on the assumption
that almost all of the users change their passwords once a year, and that most of the accounts monitored
were limited-lifespan student accounts that expire after a semester.
The rules I agreed to are:
1. I would be the only person to ever see the private key used in the encryption. I would not disclose
that key to anyone, nor put it in a position where it might be disclosed.
2. All key generation and analysis activities would be conducted on an isolated machine not connected
to any other machine via phone line or network during such time as sensitive data or software was
present on accessible media.
3. No specific words from the collected data would be published in any form unless they also appeared
in other, well-known dictionaries and sources, and if I obtained clearance from all the system adminis-
3
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trators whose machines were monitored. After the time limit, publication of selected or representative
examples will be allowed, but the full list will not be published.
4. Decrypted passwords would be analyzed only by myself, or at mostby myselfand one trusted graduate
assistant who also agrees to abide by these restrictions. The system administrators of the machines
being monitored have a "veto" over the graduate assistant, should I seek to have one assist in the
analysis.
With these restrictions in place, the chief threat to the security of the accounts whose passwords were
collected is through my intentional misuse of the data so collected. Although this is indeed a risk, the
administrators of the systems involved believe it to be small enough as to be of no real concern.
2.3 User choice
As the collection mechanism was planned and tested, we decided it would be appropriate to both tell users
about the research, and give them the opportunity to bypass the collection mechanism. This was decided
for two major reasons.
First, although there was no compelling administrative requirement to tell users about the collection
effort, we4 believed that it was only correct to provide some notice to the users that their passwords were
being collected. The collection effort itself was not intended to be secret, and we felt that giving the users
information ahead of time would forestall any questions about how or why we were collecting the choices.
We also felt that it was the proper thing to do.
Second, as noted in the previous section, there is some small risk associated with me misusing the
collected passwords. Accounts are provided with an intent to provide users some privacy in their account
usage, and the collection effort effectively rendered those accounts accessible to me, should I wish to try
the list of accumulated passwords. Thus, by providing the users with an option to bypass the collection,
they could have somewhat more assurance that their account was protected against any tampering by me.
As some of the machines being monitored had accounts for university staff and senior faculty in several
departments, this seemed especially appropriate.
Therefore, when the password collection routine was installed the original, unmodified pas swd and
yppasswd commands were renamed as _passwd and _yppasswd for users to execute if they wished.
Additionally, the following notice was edited slightly at each site and posted to the local newsgroups:
Your assistance is requested to aid Professor Spafford (Computer Sciences) in his research on
ways of improving computer security. This research is on new ways of protecting passwords
to user accounts. Previous research and experience has shown that over 80% of all computer
break-ins result from poor choices of passwords, so research in this area is quite important.
You do not need to do anything special to aid in this research. Just set your password as you
always do, using the commands you normally use (e.g., "passwd" and "yppasswd"), when you
need to use them. Don't do anything differently than you normally would. When you use
the commands, your password will be changed as normal. However, something else will also
4
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happen: an *encrypted* version of your password will be saved in a special database for further
analysis.
You do not need to worry about your password being seen by anyone else, or even traced back
to you. The *only* infonnation we will save is what you type as a password - there is no
record made ofyour name, your account name, time ofchange, or other identifying infonnation.
Furthennore, your password is being mixed in with the passwords from thousands of accounts
on machines at Purdue. There will be NO way to trace the password back to you.
There is also no way anyone will use this infonnation to break into your account. Professor
Spafford has written the software so that it uses a strong RSA public key to encrypt the collected
passwords. He is the only person with the private key necessary to read the passwords, and
he will only decrypt and work with the passwords on his private machine, unconnected to the
network.
The system administrators at CS and PUCC have agreed to participate in this study because
of the great value it has for security research. They would not have agreed to have this data
collected unless they were sure that it was safe, and that Professor Spafford could be trusted in
this experiment.
This collection experiment will run from August 1st until May 1. At that time, the nonnal
password programs will be reinstalled. You should plan on changing your password after May
1 (it is generally a good idea to change your password about every 6 months, anyway). If you
do not change your password between August 1 and May 1, no infonnation will be collected
about your password at all.
[Description of how to opt out by using _passwd or equivalent stated here.]
If you wish to know more about this study, contact Professor Spafford directly, by email to
spaf@cs, or visit him at the CS building. If you have other questions about system operation,
contact [put your local contact info here].
Not surprisingly, no users ever contacted me or any of the system administrators about this collection
effort. Checking the access times on the renamed, unmodified programs on a few systems revealed that they
had not been used or were used infrequently during the collection period.
As noted in the posting, above, the collection process was written so that there was absolutely no
infonnation saved about the account when a password was changed. It would have been helpful to get some
indication of whether the user involved was a novice or expert, but the general agreement was that there was
no easy way to detennine that infonnation from the account alone, and that it would further help protect the
safety of the users if their passwords were stored unattributed. The software was so designed.
2.4 Uniformity
One goal of the collection process was to have as complete and unbiased a sample of passwords as possible.
This meant that we wanted to collect passwords from novices as well as experienced users, and without the
effects of any existing screening mechanism. Unfortunately, there is no way to be certain that there is a
bias present in such a collection. Furthennore, because we notified users that their passwords were being
collected, it could be argued that this introduced a significant bias from the beginning.
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We attempted to compensate for a few of the confounding effects, however. First, we built the software
to be integrated into the existing commands, thus presenting users with an unmodified interface to changing
their passwords. Second, the passwords were collected after they were typed but before any local screening
mechanism was used (e.g., screening against / us r / di c t /words). The combination ofthese two changes,
and the apparentlack ofuse ofthe original programs (see the previous section), tends to indicate that any bias
introduced by the collection methodology is small. There is no statistical evidence to prove this, however.
As a final design feature, the code was written so that passwords set on an account by the super-user, as
might happen when an account was created or reinstated, would not be added to the collection. Thus, initial
or temporary passwords would not be present and skew the collection.
2.5 Administrative concerns
When I first approached some of our system administrators locally about collecting passwords, they were
understandably hesitant to agree. To enlist their aid required that I very clearly address their concerns about
user account safety and system protection. The actions described in the previous sections helped address
many of their concerns, and these items were developed during negotiations with them. However, two other
major concerns remained.
Installing the collection software required changes to setuid software on the system. This could clearly
present an opportunity to introduce a trojan horse into the system. Furthermore, the collection effort might
potentially involve the collection ofpasswords to administrative accounts. Both of these were sufficient to
make a cautious system administrator reluctant to install the collection software.
To answer both of these remaining concerns required very little effort. To address the first, that of
installing software into setuid utilities, we distributed the changes to the software as source code and
allowed the system administrators to compile, test, and install the software themselves. Thus, the system
administrators were able to read the code provided and modify it as they wished for their local system.
The second concern was addressed by including a "stop list" that contained a list of all accounts that
would automatically have their passwords excluded from the collection. Into this list could be put any
account names that were deemed too sensitive for password collection. In this manner, if an administrative
user forgot and used the modified password-changing programs, their passwords would automatically be
excluded from the collection. The root user was added to this list by default for every machine. Each
system administrator could edit that list as they wished to add or delete names.
As a final measure, we designed the software so it would collect to a local file. It was therefore up to the
system administrator of each machine to decide when (and if) to provide that file to us. In this manner, if a
decision was reached part way into the collection process to disable the collection, it could be done without
any passwords ever being delivered to me. As a matter of convenience, when the passwords were actually
collected, I did not ask for the files until the end of the collection period.
With all of these conditions and restrictions in place, we found no objection to installing the collection
software and running it.
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3 Preliminary Analysis
The collection software was installed in August of 1991 and was run until May 1, 1992. It was run on 54
machines in the Department of Computer Sciences and the Computing Center, representing approximately
7000 user accounts. Almost 19,100 password change attempts were collected. Of these, 5309 were
duplicates. It took five days of computing on a SPARCstation I computer to decrypt the collection.
Because of the restrictions on publication described above, it is not possible to present a complete
analysis of the words collected. However, there are some interesting statistics about the words collected,
and those can be presented here.
3.1 Statistics
Of the 13787 unique password entries examined, the average length was 6.80 characters. The lengths of
passwords are given in table 1.



















24 of the passwords used meta-characters (characters where the eighth bit is set; this is normally a
parity bit, or used to indicate special characters). Several of these passwords were composed solely of
meta-characters. However, the way the password algorithm is designed, these characters are equivalent to
the corresponding regular characters, and most of the passwords using these characters were equivalent to
simple words in the dictionary.
3988 of the entries consisted of solely lower-case characters, 5259 contained a mixture of upper and
lower-case, and 5641 contained at least one upper-case character. Only 188 passwords (1.4%» contained
control characters of any kind.
4372 passwords contained at least one digit. 566 passwords contained a space character (space or tab).
837 passwords used at least one comma, period or semicolon character in the password. 222 passwords
contained a dash, equals sign, underscore, or plus sign. 654 passwords used at least one character present
on a shifted digit key on a standard Sun keyboard. 229 passwords contained at least one of the remaining
non-alphanumeric characters. These statistics are summarized in table 2.
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As a preliminary indication of how well the collected passwords would fare against a dictionary attack, I
did some comparisons of the collected passwords against my collection of wordlists and dictionaries. All
comparisons were performed against the lower-case version of all collected passwords (Le., the upper-case
letters were changed to lower-case). Furthermore, words that were all alphanumeric with a leading or
trailing digit or punctuation character were also checked with those characters removed; this only accounted
for 15 matches.
The first comparison was against words present in the / ete /pas swd file on the machines being tested.
Basically, this information included the user name, phone number, and account names. There were 12839
unique words derived from these files, and 592 passwords (3.9%) were found to match words in that list.
A second comparison was made against the standard dictionary on the system, /usr / diet /words.
The version used was the one shipped with SunOS 4.1.1, and has 25144 words. 620 of the collected
passwords matched words in this dictionary.
A third set of comparisons was then performed against dictionaries in 11 languages. These dictionaries
have been collected from various sites on the Internet. They have not been carefully edited in some
cases, and many contain typos and attempts to represent diacritical marks in plain ASCn. Also, there is
considerable overlap between the various dictionaries involved. However, the majority of words in each
dictionary represent standard words and names in the designated language. The results of matching against
these is presented in table 3. The words were next compared against a list of names in various languages,
both given names and common surnames. 1271 matches were made against this list.
As a last comparison, the collected words were matched against a large "miscellaneous" list of words
derived from various collections. These words include movie names, characters from mythology, sports
teams, an atlas, and many other word lists. 2498 matches were found in this comparison - the most of any
other single list.
In all, 2754 of the collected passwords (20%) were quickly found using simple dictionary and wordlist
lookups. From past experience, I would guess that as much as another 10% might be matched by doing
more involved transformations on the collected words, such as pairing short words together, substituting the
11

























digit "0" for the letter "0" in words, etc. However, that analysis has yet to be conducted.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented the design of a password collector. The collector was designed to support analysis
of a new password screening mechanism, but the collector itself has presented some interesting challenges
of design. The collector uses a public-key algorithm to safely store collected passwords for later analysis.
The collection process presents no observable danger to the instrumented systems. The approach used may
be replicated in other environments, and may be easily extended to collect other information.
Preliminary analysis of the collected passwords reveals them to be somewhat more complex than we
had first imagined. Prior to the start of the analysis, we believed we would find a large percentage of the
passwords in our dictionaries and common wordlists. In part, this was because of the large number of
novice users on the monitored machines, and in part because of the attitude towards passwords security
that many of our users seem to exhibit. Surprisingly, only lout of 5 passwords were immediately found in
the dictionaries. At the same time, the number of passwords containing control characters and punctuation
characters is lower than we expected. Overall, however, this experiment illustrated how unconstrained user
choices for passwords may compromise security, with at least 20% of all chosen passwords being weak.
More analysis of the collected words remains to be done. Additionally, the collection of password
choices may now be used to calibrate a prototype of the OPUS system. Further details of this work will be
reported in later papers.
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